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Abstract
While the human consequences of Ireland’s economic crash have been well documented and 
scrutinised, the systemic deceptions underpinning the so-called Celtic Tiger have received far 
less attention. The boom years were characterised by speculation, with government policy ever  
more attendant to the interests of property developers and lenders, leading to an increasingly 
unstable financial pyramid that eventually imploded. Though the crash demonstrated that much 
of the wealth creation was actually debt creation, this did nothing to mitigate the pervasive  
influence of finance capital over broader institutions. On the contrary, the dominance of finance 
capital, its capacity to preserve fictitious claims on wealth, to burden others with private debt,  
was demonstrated in full. We critique the ponzi character of Ireland’s property bubble, banking 
crisis and subsequent ‘solutions’. In doing so we draw attention to civil and state institutions 
that contributed to, or facilitated, the illusions of sustainable growth alongside observed efforts  
to maintain secrecy and silence, obfuscations, and ultimately the post-crash closing of ranks  
and scapegoating of myriad targets. We call this the Madoffization of Irish society, since the 
core enabling elements of this process were paralleled in Bernie Madoff’s $65bn scam that was  
exposed in 2008 as the US financial crisis went global.
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Introduction
As the ‘global financial crisis’ (GFC) continues to exert its effects, many people in Western nations 
are facing an increasingly precarious future. This is the consequence of the toxic fallout following the  
US subprime debacle in 2007/8, of the near collapse of the world’s interconnected banking system 
and  governments’  socialisation  of  private  speculative  losses  amassed  throughout  the  finance, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector. In this context, ideological fictions, which serve dominant  
class interests, are continually recycled as if they were irrefutable facts. Claims such as ‘too big to  
fail’, ‘nobody saw this coming’, ‘there is no alternative to austerity’ and ‘we are where we are’ are  
reiterated ad nauseum (McCullagh, 2011). Under such conditions – what Klein (2007) terms ‘disaster 
capitalism’ – political elites and other representatives of (finance) capital are also telling publics that  
‘we are in this together’ and ‘sacrifices’ are required in order to satisfy the markets, ensure economic 
stability and recovery. Yet, there are few signs of recovery. Furthermore, as the spectre of a deepening 
crisis haunts Europe and Western capitalism, social inequalities and inequities continue to increase,  
financial institutions and sovereign nations continue to be downgraded and social unrest is escalating. 
Precariousness, long experienced by those lower down the social hierarchy, is becoming ubiquitous in 
this so-called age of austerity, characterised by expansive indebtedness, crisis and uncertainty.         
Ireland fits all too (un)comfortably into this narrative of disaster and expropriation (Allen, 2009), with 
the government in 2008 putting up ‘the entire Irish State as collateral for the crushing liabilities of six 
private banks ... approximately €400 billion in leveraged loans’ (McCabe, 2011a: 169). As we will 
elaborate,  Ireland  is  a  worthy  case  study for  sociologists  seeking  to  interrogate  the  causes  and  
consequences  of  the  current  GFC  (itself  a  manifestation  of  the  contradictions  of  capitalism, 
financialization  and  thus  deeper  historical  and  social  structural  dynamics)  (Deutschmann,  2011). 
Following the spectacular crash of the nation’s (overinflated) FIRE sector in 2008, bank guarantee and 
Troika (IMF/EU/ECB) bail-out in 2010, Ireland is witnessing ongoing crisis and deepening austerity.  
Moreover, the resultant ‘shock therapy’ (Klein, 2007) and attendant redistribution of wealth to elites,  
the hallmark of global neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), is impacting the most vulnerable members of  
society hardest who oftentimes find themselves being blamed in the mainstream media for the crisis. 
Cuts to social welfare, health, education, income and overall  quality of life are ongoing, a reality 
similarly shared by increasing numbers  of  people  across  Europe.  Indeed,  the  protracted  crisis  in 
Ireland appears to have no resolution and has been met by the current coalition government’s primary  
efforts to satisfy predatory capitalists (notably international senior bondholders of unsecured bank 
debt)  (Allen,  2009).  The once proud (debt-financed)  ‘Celtic  Tiger’ has  fallen prey to  finance-led 
globalization albeit with specific national permutations and twists. 
In this paper we will extend our emergent and developing theoretical framework on what we call the  
Madoffization of society (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012a). We have recently used this framework to 
critique  the  extractive  processes  of  super-speculative  global  neoliberalisation  in  general  and  the 
political and economic conditions underlying more specific events, such as social unrest and official  
responses to that unrest in the UK (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012b). In what follows we will turn our 
attention to Ireland’s ongoing crisis  and what  McCabe (2011a)  terms the ‘insanity’ of  the state’s 
guarantee of the country’s main financial institutions (such as the infamous Anglo Irish Bank). In so 
doing, we are interested at a more formal level in developing our emergent thesis, which is reflective  
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of the madness of the world which we are witnessing. Madoffization is presented here as an ideal  
typical  model  or  heuristic  device,  which,  we  suggest,  has  value  when  critically  exploring  and 
challenging the corrosive ‘fictions of fictitious capital’ (Hudson, 2010). After outlining our thesis and 
other relevant theory that sheds light on the intersections of global and transnational processes of 
neoliberal extraction, we will locate Ireland’s economic rise and fall within the contours of rampant 
super-speculative (ponzi) finance and financialization (Hassan, 2011). This, in turn, will allow us to 
unpick and explore the core elements of Madoffization, as it has unfolded in Ireland in recent years,  
incorporating: accumulation through debt expansion, mass deception, efforts to maintain secrecy and 
silence, obfuscation and scapegoating. We will then conclude with some reflections on the madness of 
the Madoffized society in Ireland and beyond and the possibility of not only interpreting but also  
changing the world. 
The Madoffization of Society Thesis
As the word Madoffization implies, we take Bernie Madoff and his Investment Securities firm as our 
infamous referent. We use this as a lens for viewing the current contradictions and fictions of finance 
capitalism, its crisis tendencies, logics and corrosive social consequences. Madoff was a leading Wall 
Street player who is a symbol and symptom of an extractive system where ‘control fraud’ and other  
forms of white collar crime have proven endemic in political and financial institutions on both sides 
of the Atlantic (Black, 2005; Mahon, 2012). In 2009, Madoff was convicted to 150 years in prison for  
running a US$65bn ponzi scheme, which was exposed during the 2008 financial crisis. We detail 
Madoffization  elsewhere  (Monaghan  and  O’Flynn,  2012a),  though,  in  the  interests  of  reader 
orientation and convenience, we will outline our basic thesis below. For now, we stress that we are  
much less concerned with individual fraudsters than we are with interrogating the system that permits  
claims on wealth to grow and grow apart from any corresponding creation of wealth. In short, we are 
interested in the practices, relations, logics and institutions that facilitate parasitic wealth extraction.
First, some words on the Madoff case and what we mean by Madoffization. As is usual among those 
who  construct  ponzi  schemes,  where  money from new ‘investors’ (marks)  is  used  to  pay older  
entrants (Lewis, 2012), Bernie Madoff robbed Peter to pay Paul. However, rather than ‘buying into’ 
the common condemnatory narrative or simplified ‘pre-emptive political logics’ (Glynos et al., 2012), 
where Madoff is considered no more than a ‘rotten worm’ in an otherwise ‘healthy green apple’  
(Žižek, 2009: 36), we contend that his fraud, perpetrated on such a massive scale over several years,  
was only possible because broader structural and institutional arrangements enabled this to happen.  
Regulators investigated Madoff’s operation and red flags were raised by a fraud investigator over a  
nine year period (Markopolos, 2010) yet his scheme continued right up until 2008. While Charles 
Ponzi, in early twentieth century USA, was something of a smooth criminal who relied on his wits  
and a convincing cover story (Zuckoff, 2005), Madoff enjoyed considerable cultural and social capital  
right at the heart of the world’s financial system. Madoff founded and later chaired the NASDAQ 
stock exchange and this Wall Street ‘big shot’ was well placed to extract billions from various marks,  
including banks such as Santander which was defrauded of US$2.6bn. As with Žižek (2009), what we 
find most interesting about this episode is the degree to which Madoff provides a mirror on the world  
of finance capital which, through the contradictory logics and demands of a self-devouring capitalist  
system (Ticktin, 2009), has morphed into a ponzi scheme of epic proportions. In short, Madoff is the 
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tip of an iceberg in neoliberalised societies where ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2005) has 
been supercharged through astronomical debt expansion (as happened with bank bailouts and shifting 
private  losses  onto  the  sovereign  balance  sheet).  This  is  the  disturbingly logical  consequence  of  
financialisation  and  rampant  speculation  amidst  the  deregulation  and  desupervision  of  (virtual)  
markets and, as explained by Harman (2009), declining opportunities for profitable investment in the 
productive economy. This is the Madoffization of society.
There  are  good  reasons  why  the  Madoff  analogy features  centrally  in  our  account  of  Ireland’s  
spectacular rise and fall. Ireland’s property and banking sectors presented as crucial elements of a  
giant society-wide ponzi scheme. Irish banks sold bonds to institutions in Europe, using this borrowed 
money to fund property development. This provided the impetus for continued speculation on price, 
subsequent repayments of loans with interest, which permitted banks to sell more bonds, closing the 
circle by further fuelling the property bubble (until the inevitable collapse) (McCabe, 2011a; Kerrigan 
2012).  However,  there  was more  to  this  than simple  ponzi  financing.  As with the  Madoff  scam, 
Ireland’s  property  bubble  rested  on  deceptions  that  were  rooted  in  mainstream institutions.  The 
difference between a typical ponzi scheme and what we call a Madoffized scheme is that the latter is  
facilitated by the state, by the economics profession, by regulatory authorities, by rating agencies and  
by the  mass  media.  We  consider  the  dominance  and pervasive  influence  of  finance  capital  over  
broader societal institutions crucial here. We are speaking of an environment in which society-wide 
fraud and the delusions necessary to sustain parasitic activity are routinized. As such, we contend that  
‘disgraced bankers’ like Sean Fitzpatrick, are not the source of Ireland’s current woes, that they are in 
fact the disturbingly logical products of a transnational Madoffized system. 
The Madoffization of society, notably in the USA and its outposts such as the UK and Ireland, was  
supercharged  following  the  deregulation  and  desupervision  of  financial  markets  from the  1980s 
onwards.  Other  ‘enablers’ (Rasmus,  2009:  39) and stimulants have included developments  in the 
forces of production (computer technology, notably the internet that supports instant global trading) 
and  capitalism’s  finance  and  ‘securitization  revolution’  in  ‘commodity  money  forms’  and 
‘intermediaries’ (e.g. Credit Default Swaps, Structured Investment Vehicles, Hedge Funds) (Rasmus, 
2008: 26). Such financial ‘innovations’ are of particular relevance to our thesis, where accumulation 
through debt expansion is a central hallmark of Madoffization.  Deutschmann (2011: 383) explains 
that ‘securitization’ means ‘to release debts from relationship, disembed them, and give them “thing-
like” qualities, to make them liquid. Once reified (turned into things), debts can circulate more freely,  
and be bought and sold on markets’. Securitization is, of course, an essential ingredient in the latest  
‘bubble economy’, most spectacularly observed in real estate, though it is symptomatic of deeper, 
underlying mechanisms in divisive capitalist societies (Harman, 2009).
Instability  is  endemic  within  the  global  capitalist  system  but  the  invention  of  myriad  financial 
instruments increased the tendency towards speculative as well as super-speculative (ponzi) activity,  
typically in non-productive spheres, and ultimately a ‘Minsky moment’ of epic proportions (Harman, 
2009;  Rasmus,  2008).  As explained by Rasmus (2008),  when critically extending the theories  of 
Minsky and Marx to the deepening global crisis, the FIRE sector became the engine-room of ponzi  
finance wherein it was assumed that wealth could be made outside of real production. For Glynos et  
al. (2012), this phase of growth in neoliberal finance, lasted some twenty years and ‘was underpinned 
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by,  and  in  turn  fed  into,  potent  fantasies  of  unlimited  growth  and  prosperity’ –  a  ‘fantasmatic 
dimension’ (p. 301). Culminating in an ‘accident’ and ‘blowoff’ (ibid.) or ‘epic recession’ (Rasmus, 
2009), this fictitious ‘wealth creation’ consisted of banks and other creditors lending vast amounts of  
interest-bearing money that was then pumped into rising (overinflated) assets, in the expectation of 
securing future returns (note, in particular, housing, which had particular salience in the US subprime 
crisis and, as we will  elaborate, Ireland’s property ‘boom’). For Rasmus, finance capital achieved  
dominance in a context where ‘the drive for profitability amidst systemic counter-pressures reducing 
profitability’ (2008: 7) underpinned the acceleration of ponzi speculation in the twenty-first century.  
We lack space to discuss the temporal development of Madoffization, though Rasmus offers important 
insights when describing the swift acceleration of financially destabilising speculation post-2000 as 
actors sought super-profitable returns as quickly as possible and without actually producing anything 
(also, see McCabe, 2011a on derivatives trading and the US Commodity Futures Modernization Act).
An Outpost of the USA: Ireland’s Place in Global Ponzi Finance
‘By the time the last of the barriers to speculative financial trading are lifted in the US, Ireland is  
more than ready to take the world’s money. In 2008 the veneer of cheap credit suddenly fades, 
leaving the shaky edifice of the Irish economy exposed’ (McCabe, 2011a: 10-11). 
Substitute ‘Madoff’ for ‘Ireland’ and ‘ponzi scheme’ for ‘Irish economy’ and McCabe (2011a) could 
have quite easily been writing about the US$65bn implosion of the Wall Street fraudster’s enterprise.  
Yet, our interest here is in Madoffized Ireland where the total sums of money are much higher (Killian 
et al. 2011). To be clear, Ireland’s FIRE sector has periodically thrown up examples of the classic  
ponzi scheme and, as such, we do not for one moment imagine an innocent past. For instance, in 1983 
the Private Motorists Provident Society ceased operating after its parent company collapsed and the  
government discovered it ‘was using revenue from new customers to pay old customers’ (McCabe,  
2011a: 142). However, before explaining why we consider contemporary Irish society more generally 
to have been Madoffized we will locate the nation in global ponzi finance, i.e. the larger financialized 
system wherein private banking interests became hegemonic (Deutschmann, 2011). As part of this 
discussion we are interested in locating Madoffization ‘Irish style’ within the contradictory dynamics 
of finance capital comprising: structured social relations, organisational practices, cultural meanings  
and vested material  interests  that  transcend while  remaining embedded within (amplified by)  the 
nation state. Also comprising documented political corruption that was ‘both endemic and systemic’ 
(Mahon, 2012:1), Ireland’s ‘golden circle’ of powerful interests continued and flourished even after 
their financial house of cards crashed in 2008; the FIRE sector quickly demanded and received a 
historically unprecedented ‘bail-out’ (the socialisation of private losses that ultimately led to Troika 
intervention in 2010). 
In contextualising the ‘rise and fall’ of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’, and the current indebtedness of the  
people of Ireland to financial interests we would, similar to Deutschmann (2011), avoid the limitations 
of  simply  focusing  on  the  failings  of  regulators  or  cyclical  financial  instability.  Rather,  we  are 
interested in aspects of Ireland’s economic history in the twentieth-century and, given the centrality of  
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the  debt-fuelled  property  boom post-2000,  the  country’s  reliance  on  publicly  subsidised  private 
housing  development  (McCabe,  2011a).  Such  processes,  more  generally,  relate  to  the  growing 
importance of the FIRE sector in the post-1970s era of global neoliberalisation (Harvey, 2005) and 
‘the great delusion’ that prevailed in Anglo-Saxon capitalism towards the end of the twentieth-century 
where it was maintained there was ‘no more busts, only booms’ (Harman, 2009). Indeed, it is here that 
we would concur with Allen (2009) who considers Ireland ‘an outpost of the USA’ (p. 152), reflecting 
a general trend wherein the FIRE sector has been pivotal in those neoliberal nations that have relied  
on (debt-fuelled) bubbles more so than real production to sustain ‘economic growth’. 
In Ireland, from the 1960s onwards, foreign financial interests (including American banks) invested 
capital into commercial and industrial property and the domestic housing market (McCabe, 2011a).  
As per Harvey’s (2001) concept of ‘the spatial fix’, this represented the global movement of over-
accumulated  capital  in  an  attempt  to  sustain  and  expand  capitalism  -  something  that  became 
increasingly important in the twentieth century in order to mitigate, but never solve, capitalism’s crisis 
tendencies (also, Deutschmann, 2011). This capital influx, McCabe (2011a) explains, occurred in a 
weak indigenous  economy comprising  a  dominant  class  that  primarily sought  to  further  its  own 
interests  by acting as middle-men: wealth redistributors rather than wealth producers.  Aside from 
agricultural production (especially cattle), Ireland mainly depended on injections of (foreign) capital  
into financial intermediaries and the indigenous servicing of export-led multinationals, which have 
had limited direct benefit to the local economy (p. 89). All of this is significant to our Madoffization 
of society thesis since a key aspect of this extractive process entails the dominance of fictitious forms 
of capital, comprising claims on wealth rather than actual wealth production (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 
2012a). While most of the Post-Fordist Anglophone world after 1970 experienced de-industrialisation 
and the expansion of financialisation, Ireland never had significant indigenous industrial development 
(and thus a real productive economy) to begin with. It has largely ridden on the coat-tails and fortunes  
of big players  as  they pursued short-term profits  through off-shoring labour,  tax avoidance,  rent-
seeking and speculation. Small wonder, then, that Ireland suffered so badly when the 2008 GFC came 
much like a tsunami with a suddenness that took many people by complete surprise and with shocking 
repercussions for the larger society that is being forced to clear up the mess.  
Housing, a recurrent theme in the GFC following the US subprime debacle, deserves special attention. 
During the latter  part  of  the  twentieth century the Irish State  increasingly withdrew from public  
provision and incentivised private home ownership. This was partly favoured as a ‘top down’ method 
of  manufacturing  of  consent  in  a  highly conservative  state  (e.g.  owner-occupiers  are  unlikely to 
embrace  communist  ideals)  more  so  than  the  postcolonial  population’s  lust  for  property.  This 
withdrawal of public housing accelerated with the provision of large government grants in the mid-
1980s, which enabled relatively well-off working people to secure mortgages on private housing. As 
McCabe (2011a: 32) explains, ‘the privatisation of Irish housing meant that the need for a house was 
replaced by a need for a mortgage. The banks, building societies and mortgage brokers were the  
unchallenged gatekeepers to securing a home’. An obvious consequence was the inflation of house 
prices, though as we will note further below, ‘financial innovations’ in the late 1990s were especially 
consequential in that regard (see Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1: Average House Prices and Gross Industrial Wage 1977-2006 (McCabe, 2011b)
The Irish government’s housing policy, which served the financial and construction sectors so well in 
an otherwise weak or floundering national economy, not only stoked ‘asset price inflation’ but also 
increased the marginalisation (stigmatisation) of public housing. In short, the mortgage industry was 
subsided courtesy of the tax payer,  with the neoliberal  withdrawal  of the  welfare state rendering  
public housing increasingly synonymous with ‘social deprivation’ (McCabe, 2011a: 40). In its place  
was constructed a vision of ‘semi-detached owner occupiers docile with mortgage debt’ (ibid.), or 
new householders renting from private landlords as house prices increased exponentially. And, when 
compared to other developed nations, one perhaps gains a greater appreciation of the scale of this  
debt-financed bubble:  quoting  data  from the Bank of  International  Settlements,  Hennigan (2008) 
writes: ‘In 2006, Irish [house] price growth from 1970, exceeded that in Sweden by 168%, Denmark  
by 65%, Norway by 79% and Finland which has been a strong economic performer since 1993 - a  
period that coincides with the emergence of the Celtic Tiger - by 123%’. Hennigan adds that out of 18 
developed countries over a 36 year period (1970-2006), Ireland experienced the third highest growth 
in  house prices  (behind  Great  Britain,  which was the  highest  after  Spain).  What  we would also  
underscore here is the rate of this rise relative to gross industrial wage, which necessitated ever greater 
expansion of debt via bank lending outside of manufacturing production. Indeed, as seen in Figure 2,  
bank lending to the manufacturing sector hardly increased during the early years of the Celtic Tiger. 
The increase in lending was to the financial sector and personal lending (which includes mortgages).
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FIGURE 2: Irish Banks and Credit Formation/Direction, 1988-1998 (McCabe, 2012) 
We would contend that such increases in apparent wealth, especially during the 1990s, were like those 
observed in the ponzi pyramid scheme. In short, this wealth creation was as flimsy as those fictitious 
stamps that Charles Ponzi claimed to have invested his marks’ funds in so as to achieve a phenomenal 
return (Zuckoff, 2005). In a global capitalist system where excess savings were continually looking 
for  a  swift  return  (Harman,  2009),  light-touch  regulation  enabled  Irish  banks  to  borrow  from 
European banks at low levels of interest and then lend to developers and home owners - borrowing 
short-term to lend long-term (Murphy and Devlin,  2009:  6).  The boom rested on an increasingly 
unstable financial pyramid, with Irish banks lending money to property developers, speculators and 
people simply wanting a home, depending on European banks’ reckless lending in the process. 
Evidence of Irish house prices and bank lending should thus be located within Ireland’s positioning as 
a  conduit  for  global  finance.  McCabe (2011a),  whose insightful  research is  ongoing in this  area,  
discusses the creation of the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin in 1987 and 
‘favourable’ changes  in  corporation  tax  for  banks.  Ireland  effectively  became  ‘a  tax  haven  for 
financial services’ (p. 144), much akin to secretive offshore banking in the Cayman Islands, with the 
IFSC being regarded as the ‘Wild West of European finance’ (p. 148). This reputation emerged in the  
midst of a more general ‘revolution’ in the mortgage market and ‘innovations’ in financial products 
which, as noted above, were instrumental in super-speculative activity in the global financial system 
(Hassan, 2011). Describing the conditions under which the Irish state eventually came to bail-out the 
banks,  McCabe explains that such ‘financial  innovations were increasingly being used in the late 
1990s to fuel speculation in one of the least-productive economic activities: property’ (2011a: 41).  
This,  alongside tax breaks for home buyers and builders, meant that housing was constructed not 
according to social need and affordability but according to the need for capital to make a speedy tax 
deductible return. It is in this context of asset price inflation that owner-occupancy actually fell from 
the  1990s  onwards  as  prices  far  exceeded  the  average  industrial  wage,  with  many  properties 
remaining empty especially in 2007 just before the super-speculative bubble popped. Going beyond 
some of the superficialities in the Irish government’s Nyberg Report (2011) on the ‘causes’ of the 
financial crisis (e.g. the risks of so-called ‘group think’ and ‘consensus’ in the banking industry), we  
8
contend  that  historically  entrenched  class  interests,  including  the  growing  hegemony  of  finance 
capital, should take centre stage in any serious analysis of Ireland’s current woes. Indeed, in all of this, 
there has proven to be a deep rooted ‘ability of the banking sector to direct economic policy according 
to its  needs, rather than the needs of the economy’ (McCabe,  2011a:  127). The broader needs of  
contemporary Irish society, a Madoffized society, have also been ignored and damaged. 
The Madoffization of Irish Society
We will now discuss the central elements of Madoffization as they have emerged within, shaped and  
continue  to  negatively  impact  Irish  society,  notably  post-2000:  (1)  accumulation  through  debt 
expansion, (2) mass deception, (3) efforts to maintain secrecy and silence, (4) obfuscation, and (5) 
scapegoating.  These intertwined elements were observed in the original  Madoff case but,  as with 
Ireland, they are also observable in Madoffized societies. As a caveat, we do not claim the specifics of 
Madoff’s ‘con game’ were reproduced to the letter in Ireland; rather, our point is that there are formal  
parallels and, moreover, the Irish example provides an insight into the collective and pervasive nature 
of a corrosive process that has proven more insidious than Madoff’s scam.  
Accumulation through Debt Expansion: Frenzied Property Speculation and ‘Socialised Losses’ 
In the context of securitization and the making of debts into marketable things (Deutschmann, 2011),  
one person’s burden is another’s (interest bearing) asset, or, more accurately following the 2008 bank 
guarantee  and  bail-out  in  Ireland,  a  population’s  indebtedness  to  speculative  financial  interests 
represents a ‘meal ticket’ for a small and largely anonymous power elite. This, we would suggest, is a 
key dynamic in the Madoffization process where ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2005) has 
been advanced through massive debt expansion that has not only burdened everyday mortgage holders 
(notably later entrants into the Celtic Tiger housing market who were especially stung) but also the 
larger population who are currently suffering savage austerity as the government seeks to ‘honour its  
obligations’ (sic) to holders of this newly (odiously) socialised debt. If we lived in a strange parallel  
universe where Madoff was not convicted after his ponzi scheme collapsed, we would suggest the 
situation in Ireland is the equivalent of this con artist incredulously securing state support so he could 
continue extracting billions of dollars from various ‘suckers’ and live ‘the life of Riley’. An extremely 
dubitable outcome, one might assume, since the ‘security’ Madoff sold was fictitious and could only 
result in the impoverishment of an ever expanding number of people drawn into his seductive orbit of 
dreams and (self-)deceptions. Yet, as we will see, even here the ‘fantasmatic logics’ that helped to  
sustain Madoff’s venture for a period are instructive when exploring Ireland’s great  delusion and  
demise: a spectacular rise and fall that makes ‘Icarus look boringly stable’ (O’Toole, 2010: 10).
Given the dominance of bank lending for real estate in the original formulation of our Madoffization  
of society thesis and Ireland’s narrative of glory and despair, we will concentrate on such lending here  
alongside  evidence  on  the  scale  of  debt  in  Ireland  (Killian  et  al.,  2011).  Such  indebtedness  is  
enormous and likely unsustainable in a small nation with a population of around 4.5m. In their audit  
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of Irish debt, defined as debt for which the people of Ireland are ‘held responsible’ (p. 1) and which  
includes ‘debt issued by private banks, but underpinned by a state guarantee’ (p. i), Killian et al.  
provide a ‘snapshot’ of indebtedness in the first half of 2011. They conservatively estimate that total  
bank liabilities equalled €411.1bn, while the state ultimately provided cover for institutional liabilities 
equalling €279.3bn (p. 20). Regardless of the exact figures, which are often obfuscated (discussed 
further below), they dwarf Madoff’s US$65bn venture. As Killian et al. note, the ‘debt problem’ goes  
beyond Ireland with European Central Bank (ECB) statistics indicating that government debt as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the Euro area has risen exponentially after 2008.  
Yet, it is also the case that Ireland has the dubious honour of being the most burdened in the EU by 
bank debts. Taft (2013), when reviewing recent Eurostat data, notes that Ireland’s current total figure 
of €41.1bn for bailing-out banks tops the table, slightly ahead of Germany. When one considers the 
relative  size  of  these  countries  and when the  cost  is  presented  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  a  truly 
staggering picture emerges: between 2007 and 2011, 25 per cent of Ireland’s GDP was used to save 
the banks while Germany used 1.5 per cent of its GDP. When the European banking crisis is costed on 
an individual basis throughout the EU, it works out at €192 per person. The cost bourn by German  
citizens is considerably more, standing at €491. However, the cost per capita in Ireland stands at  
€8,981 (Taft, 2013). Taft writes: ‘We [the Irish] may be minnows when it comes to population and 
economic  size,  but  when  it  comes  to  banking  debt  we  are  the  whale  in  the  pond’.  If  Western 
capitalism, with its tendency towards super speculation (ponzi finance) and crisis, is to be typified as a 
Madoffized society, then Ireland represents an extreme example.            
The highly reckless, debt-financed and super speculative (ponzi) character of Ireland’s house of cards 
is evidenced in the almost total collapse of the financial sector in the immediate post-boom period. 
Accumulation  on  the  part  of  the  banks  and largest  property developers  depended on  asset-price 
inflation, the continuation of which required the same kind of institutional supports that had made the 
Madoff scam possible in the USA. The analogy is appropriate. People invested with Madoff because 
there was visible evidence of significant returns. Eventually churches, charities and people of modest  
incomes flocked to the scheme before being fleeced. Likewise, so-called high-net-worth-individuals  
invested in Irish property because there were visible gains in terms of property values in a short space 
of  time.  At  the  height  of  the  frenzy,  it  was not  only the rich who had come to view houses  as  
investments rather than as places to live, and more and more borrowed money, either in a panic to get 
on the ‘property ladder’ or to realise a windfall in the expectation of continued increase in price. The 
more  people  invested  the  more  worthwhile  the  investments  appeared  to  become,  and  the  more 
worthwhile  the  investments  appeared  to  become,  the  more  likely  people  were  to  invest.  Such 
dynamics also resonate with Zuckoff’s (2005) narrative of Charles Ponzi, a ‘financial legend’ who 
fostered ‘investor’ confidence so that new money could be reeled in thus providing funds for Ponzi 
and older entrants. Viewed as a con game (Lewis, 2012), what we see here is how the ‘mark’ (who 
must eventually be ‘cooled out’), is allowed to make some gains before the ‘operators’ of the charade 
‘depart in a ceremony that is called the blowoff or sting’ (Goffman 1952: 451; and, Glynos, 2012).  
We want to make clear that we are not simply dealing here with a handful of financial fraudsters,  
though outright fraud and thievery are endemic problems in the FIRE sector (Black, 2005; Harvey 
2005; also, see below). Quite often the same rating agencies, auditors and management consultancy 
firms  that  facilitated debt-expansion around the world were instrumental  in  the  Madoffization of  
Ireland. As late as 2006 the most respected US firms, such as Oliver Wyman, were advising investors 
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to  consider  investing  in  Anglo Irish  Bank.  In its  exclusive,  proprietary Shareholder  Performance 
Index, Anglo stood at number one on its list of top twenty investment targets (Kerrigan, 2012: 175-
176). The problem was that Anglo fostered an illusion of profitability by lending money primarily for 
speculative investments (including allegations that money was illegally lent to ‘connected’ individuals 
for the purposes of buying shares in the bank, thus propping up the illusion that the enterprise was 
sound).  Even the head of Anglo,  Sean Fitzpatrick,  borrowed €122 million from the bank he was  
charged with running. As with many other borrowers, loans were often used to speculate on property  
prices. Somehow it was not clear to economists or politicians that as soon as the trade in houses and  
commercial  properties  slowed down,  the  construction industry would  collapse,  purchasing power 
would decline, and the lending institutions such as Anglo that had borrowed money from European  
banks for speculative purposes, would be unable to repay their debts. And, as documented in Killian et 
al.’s  (2011) audit,  three  years  after  the  crash there remained approximately €30bn in outstanding 
promissory notes for Anglo Irish Bank and two other lending institutions (Irish Nationwide and EBS) 
(p. 20) – money that the people of Ireland continue to pay while living standards decline, taxes are  
increased and public services are decimated.   
In short, between them, politicians, developers, financiers and, as we will go on to explain, the mass 
media, created the greatest property bubble in Irish history, resulting in the greatest private debt crisis  
in Irish history. Though bankers’ and property developers’ interests took precedence over other sectors  
of the economy throughout the twentieth century,  the political prioritisation of their  interests  was 
amplified during the so-called Celtic  Tiger  years,  and afterwards.  Indeed,  in  December  2009 the  
government  set  up  a  rescue  scheme  as  soon as  the  wealthiest  developers  faced  bankruptcy.  The 
National  Asset  Management  Agency  (NAMA)  was  devised  by  an  economist  with  ‘intimate 
connections with the property industry’ (Allen, 2009: 141) in order to bail-out bankrupt developers, 
effectively guaranteeing  claims  on  wealth  associated  with  the  speculative  activities  of  the  boom 
period.  The  debt  amassed  by  Irish  banks  during  the  boom was  almost  always  and  everywhere 
connected to the activities of property developers and other speculators. The political control of these 
sectors was such that debt would be offloaded onto the larger population, creating the greatest public  
debt in Irish history. Our view is that Irish bankers were not necessarily more inherently reckless than 
bankers  in  Europe  or  elsewhere.  It  is  their  relative  power  and  corresponding  influence  over  
government policy, rather than the level of debt amassed, that sets them apart. As McCabe suggests, it  
is ‘the ability to transfer that debt wholesale onto the shoulders of the state which marked out Irish  
bankers as a step above their worldwide contemporaries’ (2011a: 10). And, because of such parasitic  
action, elites are enjoying ongoing accumulation of wealth while the majority suffer.
Mass Deception: More of a Docile Tiogar than a Powerful Tiger 
Our original formulation of the Madoffized society as one where mass deception has proven to be a  
core enabling element for accumulation through debt  expansion fits  well  with recent  sociological 
commentary on (post) Celtic Tiger Ireland. In Ireland of the Illusions, Perry and Corcoran (2010) refer 
to a time that encouraged mass-delusion rather than self-reflection, a diagnosis paralleled elsewhere as 
per Harman’s (2009) discussion on global financialisation, ‘the debt economy and the great delusion’ 
(p. 280). In their preface, Perry and Corcoran (2010) explain that Ireland is perhaps most accurately  
represented by the fictitious ‘Tiogar’ or Tiger Cow (given that Ireland’s productive sector is largely 
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tied to cattle farming which was overshadowed by illusions that  the economy was a much more  
powerful and exotic beast). The Tiogar, a piece of artwork produced in 2005 when Ireland roared with  
apparent success, was vandalised and set on fire during its public display in Dublin - prescient given 
the ‘ultimate fate of its  close namesake,  the Celtic Tiger’ (p.  ix).  Besides such deceptions in the 
cultural  imaginary and subsequent  myths  about  the  post-crash  Irish  economy (e.g.  workers  have 
priced themselves out of the market, there is a bloated public sector, NAMA will come to the rescue) 
(Allen, 2009) we would be mindful of fraudulent institutional practices which ‘are noted strategies for  
boosting profits’ within the FIRE sector (Deutschmann, 2011: 358).    
Just as the US FIRE sector burnt to the ground following the securitisation of ‘liar loans’ and  the 
subprime mortgage debacle (Blackburn, 2008), Ireland’s fortunes took a nosedive in a context of mass 
deception. Evidence of ‘fraudulent practices’ which remained hidden during the boom is continually 
emerging. Indeed, as with the recent collapse of the 150-year-old Irish stock broking firm, Bloxham, 
which played its part in property speculation, there are ongoing reports of ‘accounting irregularities’  
which, along with instances of ‘false accounting’ and misuse of client funds elsewhere in the FIRE  
sector, have left investors and the tax payer worse off (Molloy and Dineen, 2013). While we will flag 
documented corruption in the political sphere (Mahon, 2011) it is also worth noting how circulating 
narratives in Ireland have deceptively nationalised and democratised blame for the crash. The notion 
that home-owners were growing wealthier with increasing property prices is now rightly understood  
as an illusion. But to what extent was this self-delusion? According to McWilliams (2007: 109), ‘[n]o-
one who has seen Irish people queuing up to buy second and third homes can suggest that what they  
have seen is rational’. Home buyers during the boom period were, according to McWilliams, acting as  
‘members of the cult of property’. And as with any population, when the Irish ‘come under the spell  
of property or any asset cult, all logic is thrown out the window’ (p. 109-110). But to simply explain 
the  property bubble  in  terms  of  mass  delusion  is,  we  would  argue,  too  convenient,  itself  a  de-
contextualised sleight of hand that diverts attention from dominant class interests and institutionalised 
deceptions that facilitated accumulation through debt expansion before, during and after the crash.  
Though  expressed  as  a  thought  exercise,  McWilliams  depiction  of  ‘property  mania’ is  not  that  
dissimilar to Taoiseach Enda Kenny’s utterance at the 2012 World Economic Forum, at Davos, where 
he claimed (apparently with some degree of sincerity)  that ‘what happened in our country is that  
people simply went mad with borrowing’ (Journal.ie, 2012). In satirical fashion, Kerrigan builds on 
this general viewpoint: ‘Arm in arm, it seems, factory and office workers decided with millionaire  
developers to build ghost estates in the middle of bogs. The unemployed joined Mr Lenihan [then 
Minister for Finance] in agreeing to guarantee all the lousy gambles the bankers made’ (2012: 104). 
Certainly,  many individuals  did get  caught  up in the property-buying mania.  Many home-owners 
assumed that their personal wealth was steadily increasing with the increasing exchange-value of their 
homes in line with the ‘fantasmatic logics’ (Glynos et al. 2012) outlined above. However, this does  
nothing to substantiate pop-psychology theories about the Irish ‘property-owning gene’ or the ‘cult of  
property’. The inflation of the Irish housing bubble cannot be explained apart from the relative power 
of developers and financiers, apart from government policy, apart from innovations in the deregulated 
FIRE sector, and apart from the use of incentives and the elimination of alternatives (McCabe, 2011a).  
Likewise, the property bubble of the Celtic Tiger period is intelligible only through consideration of 
the  interests  served by asset-price  inflation.  During the boom period mainstream economists  and  
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journalists did very little to examine the sectors dominating policy to this end, or consequently of the 
ponzi character of the system. 
In an earlier period of economic crisis Sinclair (1935: 109) explained that it ‘is difficult to get a man  
to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it’. So it was seven 
decades  later  among  Irish  lenders,  developers,  estate  agents,  politicians  and  media  pundits.  For 
example,  there was increasing evidence by 2007 that  the countryside was being filled with ghost  
estates.  Efforts  were  thus  stepped up  by various  ‘ropers’ to  maintain  the  illusion.  Evidence  was 
mounting  daily that  a  property crash  was  imminent,  but  those  voicing  concern  were  accused  of 
‘talking down’ the economy (undermining confidence). As late as July 2007 one national newspaper  
columnist wrote: ‘I think I know what I'd be doing if I had money … I'd be buying property. In fact, I 
might do it anyway’ (O’Connor, 2007). According to O’Connor, there was no need for alarm since  
‘the big picture suggests a 3 per cent drop’. Therefore ‘[i]f you're smart and you have balls and you’re  
dealing with the right buyer you can knock 10 per cent or more off the price of a house these days … 
it makes sense to buy property now’. O’Connor worked for the Irish Independent, and the newspaper 
relied heavily on revenue generated from advertising property across the country.
Preston and Silke (2011) have drawn attention to the role of the Irish press in this regard.  They 
highlight  the extent  to which the newspapers benefitted from the continuing asset-price inflation,  
primarily through their  very ‘lucrative  and non-critical  property supplements’.  Additionally,  Irish 
media companies made substantial investments in property listing websites. Preston and Silke went on 
to examine 449 articles in the property, business, opinion, and news sections of the Irish Times in the 
three week lead-up to the 2007 general election. They found that ‘of the sixty articles describing 
residential properties, and the nineteen describing commercial property not one (this at the height of  
the Irish bubble) considered if  the  properties may be overvalued’ (Preston and Silke,  2011).  The 
capacity of the media to accurately report on the causes and consequences of continued asset-price 
inflation was hampered by the fact that a key source of their revenue depended on the maintenance of 
public confidence, or popular delusions within a broader system of fantasmatic logics. 
In addition to vested media interest and influence which helped fuel the deception, continued asset-
price inflation depended on the very lucrative relationships formed between developers and politicians 
during the boom period. The details of many of these ‘shady’ relationships were brought to public  
attention in the wake of the economic collapse, just as with Madoff’s ponzi scheme which could not 
be hidden once the liquidity dried up with the GFC. The Mahon Tribunal (2011) demonstrated that 
payments by developers to politicians were quite routine; donations were made on the presumption 
that rezoning decisions could be bought. Where decisions to rezone land went favourably, developers 
with substantial land would receive a windfall. The tribunal demonstrated that politicians and their 
respective parties were very much financially dependent  on the property sector.  Quite apart  from 
individual corrupt payments to politicians, Mahon found that certain companies, such as Monarch,  
were actually paying councillors (and even prospective councillors) en masse. Monarch was described 
as operating a system that was ‘the antithesis of democracy, and was in reality intended to corrupt  
councillors by way of inducement, to compromise the disinterested performance of their public duty 
to consider rezoning applications on their  merit,  and with due regard to proper planning and the 
common good’ (Mahon, 2011: 2487-88). 
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We lack the space to provide extensive discussion on the role of deception before, during and after the 
2008 collapse of Ireland’s ponzi economy. However, we will draw this section to a close with a brief  
description  on  some  incredulous  and  blatant  deceptions  in  the  political  sphere  after  the  Troika 
‘rescued Ireland’ in 2010 (itself an unbelievable framing, since it would be bankers, bond holders and 
other debt merchants who were rescued at public expense). 
In  2011 the  Fianna  Fáil  government  presiding  over  the  economic  collapse  was  unceremoniously 
thrown out of office. Not only had the government been exposed as reckless and corrupt, not only had 
it socialised private bank debt at enormous social cost, it refused to place an appropriate share of the  
burden on the high-net-worth individuals who had made spectacular profits during the boom period.  
The population were demanding something different. Though the main opposition party, Fine Gael, 
represented the same kind of politics, with a general election on the horizon its leaders began to voice  
the concerns and sentiments of the population. On 15 December 2010, from his seat on the opposition 
benches of Dail Eireann, Michael Noonan put the following to the then Minister for Finance Brian 
Lenihan. We would add, especially for readers outside of Ireland, that Noonan subsequently became 
Minister for Finance and has shamelessly continued the policies of his predecessor:
What legal or moral compulsion is on Ireland, however, to honour in full debt incurred by Irish  
banks when there was no state involvement in these arrangements? These loans were entered into 
freely by willing lenders and borrowers, with absolutely no state participation. The interest rate 
charged represented the risk at the time, and there never was a state liability. It is obscene that 
liability for these loans is now being transferred to the Irish taxpayer, in many respects to the 
poorest of the Irish taxpayers. The Irish government and the taxpayer has no liability whatsoever  
for  these  debts  … In  the  Budget,  the  minister  for  Finance  reduced  social  welfare  payments,  
punished the blind, disabled, widows, carers and the unemployed and he taxed the poorest at work, 
and for what? It was so the taxpayer can take on liability for debts the country never incurred, and  
arose from private arrangements between private institutions. What a disaster and an obscenity 
(cited in Kerrigan 2012: 183-184).  
The leadership of the Labour party expressed similar indignation and insisted that in government they 
would represent  something very different.  The fact  that  the Labour party was lining itself  up for 
coalition with Fine Gael did not wash well with many traditional Labour voters. However, enough 
were convinced that a government that included Labour would be more likely to defend workers, the 
unemployed and the most vulnerable. This was a view that Labour leader, Eamon Gilmore, carefully 
fostered in the run up to the 2011 general election. Gilmore insisted that his party ‘will not agree to  
having child benefit cut anymore and Fine Gael need to drop their plans to cut child benefit’, a claim  
repeated on the party’s election posters,  which read ‘Protect child benefit,  vote Labour’ (Browne, 
2013).  The  following year  it  became clear  the  population  would  remain saddled  with debts  that 
private  banks  owed  to  bondholders  and  very  few  promises  made  during  the  election  would  be 
honoured. Under some pressure on The Week in Politics program, aired on Sunday 9 December 2012,  
Labour Minister for Communications Pat Rabbitte admitted that promises had been made, but went 
on to add: ‘Isn’t this the kind of thing you tend to do during an election campaign?’(cited in Browne,  
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2013). Electoral politics, it seems, is about politicians making promises that they have no intention of  
keeping, undermining the very principles of democracy and broader societal trust. 
Efforts to Maintain Secrecy and Silence: Ignoring Critics and Sustaining the Costly Sham
As understood after Madoff was exposed, mass deceptions and outright illegality can remain hidden 
from broader public scrutiny for many years. Drawing from the Madoff case and fraud in the Dutch 
construction industry, van de Bunt (2010) discusses how ‘walls of secrecy and silence’ have enabled 
parasitic economic activities, in addition to other abuses of power such as systemic clerical abuse in 
the Irish Catholic Church. Moving to Ireland’s debt-economy and housing bubble, it is quite clear that 
prior to the crash even a sober analysis of the situation was effectively silenced. Consider the reaction  
to the analysis presented by Kelly at the height of the boom. Kelly (2007) argued that the rise in Irish 
house prices had to be set against the backdrop of international trends, and went on to demonstrate 
that, to a greater or lesser degree, all property booms are in fact bubbles. Between them, Ireland’s  
‘golden circle’ had fuelled a property bubble, the collapse of which was as inevitable as any ponzi  
scheme. Kelly knew this and intervened precisely with the view to upsetting the cosy consensus that  
prevailed among mainstream economists,  politicians and media commentators.  Kelly introduced a 
comparative  study of  booms  in  different  countries  which,  like  Ireland,  had  rested  primarily  on 
construction and real estate. In each case, without exception, the result was a catastrophic property 
crash; typically house prices lost 70 per cent of their boom period increase. It is not that surprising  
that  Kelly’s  intervention met  with silence,  and in retrospect,  not  so surprising that  the  two main 
national newspapers refused to publish his follow up article on the ponzi character of the property  
‘boom’. 
Such silencing, as with secretive deals and NAMA’s lack of transparency (Allen, 2009), is an enabling 
element of Madoffization. More generally, such practices are essential in the context of white-collar  
control  frauds in  the  financial  sector,  corruption  among politicians  and developers  (Black,  2005; 
Mahon, 2011; van de Bunt, 2010) or, indeed, undertaking business as usual with the assistance of 
accounting firms and law practices. On that note, consider Ireland’s increasingly active status as a tax  
haven or ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ that contributes to an estimated $250bn each year in lost taxes by  
governments  worldwide  (see  Brennan 2013).  Similarly,  whether  referring  to  indigenous  rezoning 
decisions, the shadow banking system (which has found Ireland’s political stability attractive) (ibid.)  
or algorithmic trading using ‘programs that are developed and deployed in secret’ (Hassan 2011: 399),  
there is considerable opaqueness in the global financial system and those institutions that ostensibly 
serve the public interest.  Of course,  none of this is peculiar  to Ireland but  is in fact recurrent  in  
Western  capitalism and  US  operations:  whether  referring  to  the  Enron  scandal,  Goldman  Sachs 
trading in oil derivatives or how the Federal Reserve used an obscure law to block congressional 
audits,  transparency  and  scrutiny  are  continually  thwarted  through  the  erection  of  barriers  (see 
Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012a). While the Mahon (2011) tribunal in Ireland subsequently brought 
endemic corruption to public attention, as with Madoff’s venture walls of secrecy and silence have  
served elites well when extracting wealth through non-productive activities. More insidiously than 
Madoff’s case, however, efforts to maintain secrecy and silence have continued post-2008 after the  
‘sting’ in  order  to  facilitate  incredible  debt  expansion,  as  massive  fictitious  profits  gave  way to 
massive  fictitious  losses  (accumulated  claims  on  wealth  and  production)  (Harman,  2009).  For 
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example, in addition to the veiled workings of NAMA, in 2010 the Finance Minister Brian Lenihan 
sought the expulsion of journalists from court room proceedings on bailing out Allied Irish Banks 
(Irish Times, 2010). Similarly, much secrecy surrounds the identity of bank bondholders who have  
benefited enormously from regular multi-billion Euro payments (including payments on unsecured 
bonds) and indeed how Ireland came to negotiate a ‘rescue package’ (sic) with the Troika. Given 
space constraints we will focus on two examples to ground our discussion on the relevance of secrecy 
and silence in the Madoffization of Ireland: efforts to silence (i) investigations into corruption pre-
collapse and (ii) subsequent public resistance post-collapse. 
As with Kelly’s (2007) research, we would make clear that there were informed attempts to shed light  
on  Ireland’s  fragility  and  vulnerability  before  the  2008  crisis,  but  attempts  to  keep  the  related 
deception and corruption under wraps were far more organised, self-interested and relentless. In this  
connection  it  is  worth  highlighting  the  fate  of  the  short-lived  Centre  for  Public  Inquiry,  an 
independent group founded in 2005 to expose corrupt practices in public life. The centre focused on 
several areas. It dealt with corruption surrounding the sale of natural resources, with particular focus  
on the Corrib gas field in County Mayo. It drew attention to conflicts of interest among members  
serving boards for the Dublin Docklands Development Authority and Anglo Irish Bank. Not all of its 
reports were published. The centre was directly undermined by the then Minister for Justice Michael  
McDowell, via an attack on its director, Frank Connolly (O’Cleary, 2007: 283-4). McDowell used his 
Dáil  privilege (which afforded him protection from libel)  to make the unfounded accusation that  
Connolly was associated with Latin American terrorists. The media ran with the story. Wishing to 
avoid  controversy,  the  Centre’s  philanthropic  sponsor,  Chuck  Feeney,  withdrew  funding. 
Conveniently,  the  Centre  was  never  able  to  publish  its  findings  on  Anglo  Irish  Bank,  which 
subsequently cost the country so dearly. The Centre for Public Inquiry was threatened with libel and, 
having no source of funds, it could not bear the legal costs that might result. Secrecy and silence were  
therefore maintained in Madoffized Ireland through media, political and threatened legal channels.  
Such processes have retained relevance after the financial system hit a brick wall in 2008. After all,  
we are living through a period when the people of Ireland are expected to keep paying for speculators’  
‘mistakes’ and political efforts to ‘cool them out’ necessitate silencing critics who ‘squawk’ (Glynos et  
al., 2012). ‘Squawking’ - or complaining after being conned – is an understandable public response to  
the GFC (Glynos et al., 2012). To date, though, in spite of broken election promises and the ever  
increasing  burden  placed  on  the  shoulders  of  Ireland’s  population,  such  public  contestation  and 
resistance  has  been  somewhat  muted.  Numbers  taking  to  the  streets  are  relatively small  and the 
resistance is as yet largely disorganised. This does not mean the population has been totally ‘cooled 
out’. Anger is evident in the fact that in 2012 approximately half of the country’s owner occupiers 
chose to boycott the new household charge, which is widely regarded as another ‘bailout tax’ for 
reckless and greedy bankers, speculators and bondholders. On top of this the government is subject to  
sometimes  hostile  criticism  via  new  social  media,  including  the  same  channels  that  elected 
representatives use to communicate with constituents. This is to be expected for the simple reason that  
the  general  population  is  being  subjected  to  ongoing  austerity  (and,  as  we  will  see  below, 
scapegoating) while high-net-worth-individuals are protected. Some of the anger that  is generated 
takes the form of personal insults and abuse towards politicians. This was highlighted recently after it  
was suggested that anonymous messages played a role in the suicide of minister Shane McEntee in 
December 2012. Earlier that month the problem of ‘cyber-bullying’ among schoolchildren, including 
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two young Irish girls who had committed suicide, received significant media attention. It was quite 
appropriate that such tragic incidents would focus attention on the often terrible social consequences 
of cyber-bullying. However, the political class seized on the opportunity to re-frame expressions of  
public anger towards their disastrous policies, through twitter and other new social media, as a form 
of ‘cyber bullying’ that must be stopped. The chairperson of the Oireachtas Committee on Transport  
and Communications, Tom Hayes, warned that ‘this thing can’t be left go unchecked (sic), where 
people can put up vile comments and get away with it’ (cited by Titley, 2013). Titley notes that some 
journalists echoed this sentiment, complaining a ‘venomous and toxic social media is out of control’. 
It is quite telling that it is precisely the apologists for government policy that voice the most concern 
about  the apparently anarchic nature of  social  media.  As Titley (2013)  suggests,  these objections 
actually reflect a fear on the part of the governing class of too much participation, too much critique, 
and too much democracy. As with former Finance Minister Lenihan’s insistence on a secret court 
hearing  when bailing  out  a  zombie  bank  that  is  currently subject  to  criminal  investigations,  the 
population have no right to either know about or widely condemn agents and decisions that negatively 
impact their lives. The concerns in relation to ‘bullied’ politicians have less to do with abuse than they 
have with the new media that operates beyond the control and current censorship of the business and 
political establishment. The objections, as Titley points out, have to be set against the impositions the 
government are placing on the population it is purporting to serve, the justification of which depends 
on  public  acceptance  of  the  unimaginative  neoliberal  mantra  that  there  is  no  alternative.  A lazy 
mantra, we would stress, that serves class interests by silencing those who envisage a more just and 
equitable society. Hence, far more problematic than a media ‘out of control’ is a media under control. 
A sufficiently  adversarial  media  from  the  1990s  onwards  might  have  done  something  towards 
forewarning  and  forearming  the  population,  instead  of  fuelling  ‘fantasmatic  logics’ where  it  is  
apparently possible to get ‘something for nothing’ (Glynos et al., 2012). 
Obfuscation: Economic Prize-Fighters and Fudging
Following our reference to Kelly (2007), we begin with a vignette which draws us to a consideration  
of obfuscation, or clouding an issue, another core enabling element in the Madoffization process. In  
October 2009 an economics conference was held in Kenmare. Many delegates had failed to raise the 
alarm during the expansion of the property bubble and almost unanimously supported NAMA. The 
event ran smoothly, apart from when Kelly spoke, which lead to objections from the floor. Kelly is a 
serious economist with a better track record than most. Yet some delegates condemned the conference 
organisers for giving him a platform. Kelly was unacceptable to the mainstream because he could not 
be trusted to serve the social function of official economist. Kelly was never radical. His great sin was 
that he was willing to speak aloud with little concern about how his statements might offend Official  
Ireland (Kerrigan, 2012: 111-12).
The fact that economic analysis is rarely sought from those with a record of accuracy, and invariably  
sought from those with a record of inaccuracy, raises important questions. This problem, which is  
intensified and pervasive in  the  Madoffized society,  is  certainly not  a  recent  development.  Marx 
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(1867)  famously depicted  the  economists  of  his  era  as  ‘hired  prize-fighters’.  The  post-Ricardian 
‘vulgar’ economists were thought to have abandoned science; they were in the business of obfuscation 
rather  than  illumination.  Though  the  labels  ‘vulgar’ or  ‘hired  prize-fighters’ could  be  viewed as  
hyperbole, it  is  very difficult  to disentangle Ireland’s best  known economists’ ‘analyses’ from the 
ideology and immediate interests of finance capital. More with an eye on the USA, Hudson (2010:  
425) refers to the role of ‘junk economics and junk accounting, which are the logical complements to  
fictitious  capital’ and,  we  would add,  Madoffization.  This  is  not  the  impression that  is  routinely 
presented to the public. In Ireland (as elsewhere) particular economists are conferred with the status of  
‘expert’, and regularly appear on news reports, on talk-show programs, and in the print media. Their  
status as experts is seldom questioned, even though it is quite clear that their public profiles have 
nothing  whatsoever  to  do  with  their  capacity  to  accurately  describe  reality  or  to  predict  the  
consequences of policy decisions. While economist Jim Power (who famously laughed at Morgan 
Kelly’s warnings on live television) is a household name, Terrence McDonough (who also understood 
the property bubble for what it was) is rarely seen or heard. The problem with giving an economist 
like McDonough a platform is that he refuses to rationalise government policy, refuses to obfuscate 
the real aims and consequences of ‘austerity’, and refuses to treat schemes like NAMA as any kind of  
solution to the problem facing the population. In short, he has no interest in pandering to dominant  
‘restorative political logics’ that seek to ‘cool out the marks’ (Glynos et al., 2012). 
   
Of course, there are alternatives to austerity and the Irish population are receptive to more equitable  
government policy. Insofar as taxation is necessary to fund public services, opinion polls show that 88 
per cent of the population favour increasing the taxation of workers earning over €100,000 (Rabble, 
2012). However, measures to tackle inequality in Ireland - one of the most inequitable countries in the 
EU (just behind Greece and Portugal) (McDonough and Loughrey, 2009) - are rarely discussed or 
seriously entertained in the mainstream media and political debate. In fact, such calls are typically 
obscured  with  appeals  to  promoting  and  rewarding  ‘entrepreneurship’  (tax  subsidised  wealth  
extraction) in a more ‘competitive’ (exploitative) economy where ‘savings’ (cuts to public services)  
and ‘efficiencies’ (longer working hours for less pay) are required in order to ‘satisfy the markets’  
(wealthy people). When auditing Irish debt, Killian et al. (2011) refer to what is termed ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ or,  more  critically,  ‘fudging’,  comprising  ‘the  deliberate  use  of  unclear  language  in 
negotiating a sensitive issue’ (p. 25). While they apply this concept to ECB practices and bank bail-
outs, which fits our understanding of the Madoffized society, they could have also been referring to 
other instances of obfuscation in Ireland when they add that such ambiguity ‘certainly does not serve  
the needs of the Irish people who wish to determine how they have been held responsible for this  
increased national debt’ (ibid.). And in spite of the dominant political narrative where it is claimed  
‘we must all share the pain’ as a national duty, there has not been any fairness in this hall of smoke  
and mirrors. The manner in which austerity has been imposed is a measure of the power relations 
between the dominant sectors of the economy (property and finance) and the rest. The 300 richest  
people  in  Ireland are  worth approximately €57bn,  with close  to  €6.7bn  added  to  their  combined 
wealth between 2010 and 2011 (The Independent, 2011). Yet, the government denies the existence of  
any significant  wealth in the country,  and denies that  there is  any option but  to cut  spending on  
healthcare, close police stations, cut social welfare, cut spending on education and practically every 
service of benefit to low and middle income groups. This, apparently, is all necessary to ‘honour our  
debt obligations’ (sic) and ‘restore the market’s faith’ in Ireland.
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Scapegoating: The Transference of Evil
The  final  core  element  of  Madoffization  we  will  discuss,  scapegoating,  may  be  conceptualised 
anthropologically as the ‘transference of evil’, an ‘alchemy of thought’ which, as with the Aztec’s 
ritual slaughter, somehow takes away the sins of the world (Frazer, 1919). As explained in our original 
formulation of the Madoffization thesis, scapegoating involves ‘pointing the figure of blame at myriad 
targets’ and ‘is especially salient when ponzi schemes collapse’ (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012a: 14).  
Regardless of culpability,  Bernie Madoff,  similar to Sean Fitzpatrick, are obvious scapegoats in a  
system that spawned and enabled such men to profit so handsomely at other people’s expense. These 
are the ‘rotten apples’ or ‘narrowly logical targets’ rather than worthy case studies of a broader system 
of structured class relations, figurations, logics and practices. As per Glynos et al.’s (2012) analysis of 
the GFC, scapegoating draws from and feeds ‘fantasmatic logics’ where attention is deflected ‘away 
from potentially more problematic structural issues’ (p. 301) though this does not bar the possibility of 
broader political awakening as conditions worsen in the Madoffized society.      
As noted above when discussing mass deception, and comments from the country’s  leader to the 
international community at Davos in 2012 (where the Irish apparently went mad with borrowing), this 
is  a  blame game.  It  is  a  game that  is  divorced  from the realities  of  state  policies  that  basically  
constrained people’s  everyday choices,  for  example the reliance on mortgages  for a  home in the  
absence of adequate social housing provision. The Irish government, which has never wavered in its  
determination to  load all  the costs  of  the  bank bailout  onto the population as  a whole,  has  been 
working very hard to re-direct blame for ‘the state of the nation’. In short, this entails moving the foci  
from ‘obvious villains’ in the political economic establishment to the larger population who allegedly 
‘lost their heads’ by participating in ‘a collective party’ (Allen, 2009: 152) and who now have to pick 
up the tab. Accordingly, given that the crisis is ongoing, the current government likely understands  
that the few sacrificial lambs from the ranks of the financial world and politics are insufficient to 
absolve the nation’s ‘sins’. Because the FIRE sector still holds enormous political influence, and still  
dominates the organs of public opinion, the media are generally complicit in scapegoating myriad  
targets, people who typically benefitted little from the great delusion and/or played absolutely no role 
in  the  financial  collapse.  Indeed,  since  the  beginning  of  the  downturn  the  Irish  government  has 
targeted those least capable of resisting, while congratulating itself for making ‘tough decisions’ in the 
interests  of  ‘balancing  the  books’.  The  unemployed  and  immigrants  are,  of  course,  especially 
vulnerable to scapegoating, though public sector workers also find themselves being castigated and 
demoralised. This is via a powerful employer’s organisation, IBEC, which represents many companies 
that helped inflate the speculative bubble by gambling with workers’ pensions plus a right-wing media 
which, somewhat ironically, is owned by tax exiles (Allen, 2009).   
Scapegoating is  a process familiar  to ‘the savage mind’ and consists  of  the belief  that  ‘guilt  and 
sufferings’ can be shifted to others who will take the burden; for Frazer it is related to ‘a low level of  
social and intellectual culture’ (1919: 1). Frazer’s depiction has some appeal when reflecting upon 
Madoffized Ireland and the madness we witness daily as residents in the country, though, as with 
Allen’s (2009) discussion on myths about the Irish economy, short-term material interests are also at 
work.  The  tendency to  concentrate  on  easy targets  was  brought  to  light  in  2012  when severely 
disabled people discovered that hours of personal assistance to which they were entitled (and without 
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which they could not function outside of hospitals) would be cut. The only way to publicise their  
plight was to spend an entire night in their wheelchairs protesting outside Leinster House. Cutting 
community services to the disabled, a false economy since it will likely place consequent strains on 
formal healthcare, was depicted by the government as a decision they were forced to make. This was  
on the back of successive cuts in social welfare and child benefit. To smooth the way for such cuts the  
government,  newspapers  and  the  television  stations  all  worked  together  to  focus  attention  on 
apparently ‘undeserving’ recipients. In late 2011, just as the government were planning to cut social 
welfare, Minister of State Fergus O’Dowd claimed that it  would be possible for the state to save 
€600m by tackling social welfare fraud (Taft, 2011). The suggestion that a significant number of those  
receiving social welfare were making fraudulent claims was timely. A public convinced that hundreds 
of millions of their  taxes are being lost  to frauds and cheats,  would be more likely to support  a  
clampdown,  particularly where newspapers,  state  broadcasters,  and others  so willingly repeat  the 
assertions. But as Taft points out, those claims about social welfare fraud were themselves fraudulent,  
that ‘out of a budget of nearly €20 billion, the Department of Social Protection has found only €25 
million in fraudulent payments – or about 0.1 per cent of the entire budget’. The real issue to be  
considered is the willingness of the mass media to facilitate the government’s on-going attacks and 
vilifications  of  ‘easy  targets’.  As  with  the  vilification  of  Madoff,  Fitzpatrick  and  bankers  more 
generally post-2008, this aspect of Madoffization limits deeper reflection on systemic problems and  
stymies enlightened action that could bring about a better society. 
Conclusion: The Madness of Madoffization and Fighting for Change
When discussing the circumstances leading up to Ireland’s 2008 economic crash, notably the problem 
of massive and rampant financial speculation, Allen (2009: 113) chooses to describe this as ‘a mad, 
mad world’. He goes on to cite Marx on ‘the general promotion of swindling by recourse to frenzied 
ventures’ and comments that ‘the conjurer’s trick appeared to work’ for a number of years (ibid.). We  
agree, and see fit to conceptualise this ‘mad, mad world’ as a Madoffized world. This is a globalised  
capitalism in crisis where super-speculative (ponzi) finance has run amok, creating in the USA and its  
neoliberalised outposts, such as Ireland, a debt-economy fuelled by the grand delusion where it was  
believed there  were only booms and no busts.  As described above with specific  reference to  the 
‘Ireland of Illusions’ that somehow imagined itself to be a roaring Celtic Tiger, at least for a while, the  
state backed interests  of  predatory finance capital  are doing untold damage on the economy and 
society.  The Madoffization of Ireland,  we are  unhappy to say,  has  been extremely savage and is  
ongoing. And, while Ireland may be an extreme case (or ‘basket case’ in some people’s estimation)  
given the degree to which it has been ensnared by finance capital, our understandings and modes of  
conceptualising the crisis from the periphery of Western Europe hopefully provide readers with a 
vantage for surveying other nations that are also reeling in the aftershocks of the GFC.  
Ranging from massive debt expansion to scapegoating, the core interacting elements of Madoffization 
that we have discussed are the product of and help further reproduce exploitative class relations and a  
contradictory system that is ripe for radical change. As per Bernie Madoff’s con game, the confidence 
that political leaders (in association with their economic prize-fighters and other allies) seek to sustain 
is, we would argue, wholly corrosive and increasingly untenable. The fictions of finance capital and 
the ideology of financialised global neoliberalisation more generally cannot be seriously defended in  
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light of the damage being wrought on civil society and its more vulnerable members. Rather than 
viewing the problem as a consequence of lax financial regulation, as expressed by some sociologists, 
or swallowing neoliberal obfuscations (e.g. the need for workers to take wage cuts in order to become 
more competitive) we offer a different conclusion. In short, there is a need to more broadly recognise  
and collectively challenge the mass deceptions, ideological fictions and other odious practices (e.g.  
incredible claims on wealth) that are pervasive in Madoffized societies: ways of organising the social 
which,  if left  unchecked,  will  lead to an increasingly mad and nasty world that  will  likely make 
Madoff’s 150 year jail sentence seem tame. As can be seen, then, rather than cooling out the marks it  
is our view that they should strike back (also, see Glynos et al. 2012). It is in that critical spirit that we 
have formulated our Madoffization of society thesis, providing a lens for those in Ireland and other 
financialised economies to interpret and perhaps change the world. Accordingly, it is our hope, but not 
necessarily our  expectation,  that  dispossessed  and odiously indebted  populations  will  break  their 
chains, unite and fight for more equitable social relations, genuine democracy, care and justice - the  
hallmarks of an enlightened, civilized society rather than one ravaged by predatory finance and a 
global capitalism in crisis.     
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